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Introduction
The last two European Commissions (Barroso II, 2009–2014; Juncker 2014–2019) 
saw the environment move down the political agenda (Čavoški, 2015; Peterson, 2017). 
 Barroso’s second term focused on addressing the Eurozone crisis, while Juncker’s term 
was built on a pledge to prioritise European ‘added-value’ in ten priority areas, only 
one of which had an environmental angle, and otherwise reduce the size of the EU’s 
legislative programme (Bassot and Hiller, 2019). Conversely, the early days of the von 
der Leyen Commission witnessed environmental concern returning to the very top of 
the EU’s agenda, with eye-catching plans for nothing less than a European Green Deal 
(see Chapters 12 and 16). But the heightened political status of environmental issues was 
very quickly undermined by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which negatively im-
pacted on the health of European citizens and pushed the Eurozone back into recession.
This chapter analyses how the dynamics of environmental policy making have ad-
justed to these more uncertain policy times. More specifically, it examines whether and 
to what extent EU policy is expanding, dismantling or staying broadly the same. Ana-
lysing policy dynamics over long periods of time is more difficult than first appears. 
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Summary guide
The dynamics of environmental policy making in the EU have always been in flux. 
After the heyday of relatively rapid policy development in the 1980s and 1990s, 
recent history has undoubtedly witnessed a sharp reduction in the number of new 
policy proposals and more criticism of existing rules and procedures. Are these 
new policy dynamics symptomatic of the growing maturity of the sector or an 
indication of declining political ambition? This chapter examines whether EU en-
vironmental policy is currently expanding, declining or staying broadly the same. 
It introduces different methods for measuring the direction and ambitiousness of 
policy change and applies them to specific examples of policy change. Finally, it 
discusses how and why two recent crises – the first economic (austerity) and the 
other political (Brexit) – have pushed environmental policy into more uncertain 
times which have challenged established dynamics in the sector. It concludes that 
while EU environmental policy has proven highly resilient to dismantling in the 
past, continuing political support for strong action in the future is not a given.
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For example, take the sharp fall in the number of new policy items adopted under the 
Juncker Commission. Did this imply that the EU had suddenly became less ambi-
tious on environmental matters? Or did it indicate that the environmental acquis 
had become such ‘a mature body of legislation’ (Burns, Eckersley, and Tobin, 2019, 
p. 12) (see also Chapter 20), that there were no remaining policy gaps to fill – and that the 
main legislative task was to update existing policy items? Or perhaps the main political 
priority, as underlined in the three most recent Environmental Action Programmes, is not 
policy expansion for its own sake, but the implementation of existing policy (see Chapter 13).
In a famous essay in 1972, Anthony Downs posited that environmental policy 
the world over follows five main phases. He termed this the ‘Issue Attention Cycle’ 
whereby after a new policy problem has been detected and ambitious policy responses 
have had time to bed in, the mounting cost of implementation gradually reduces both 
public and government motivation to act (Downs, 1972). The last phase, the post-prob-
lem stage, he characterised as a ‘twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic re-
currences of interest’ where public attention declines, although not as far down as the 
original level (Downs, 1972, p. 40).
Which stage is EU environmental policy currently at? As long ago as 2008, Wurzel 
argued it had moved past maturity, with the 1990s described as a period of ‘sedate’ pol-
icy development, although the 2000s showed signs of ‘selective activism’ specifically on 
climate change–related issues (Wurzel, 2008). If true, selective activism would arguably 
be marked by at least some policy expansion (i.e., the adoption of new policies and/or 
the updating of existing policies), albeit not across the board. But selective activism may 
also involve some dismantling, i.e., the cutting, removal or weakening of existing poli-
cies (Jordan, Bauer, and Green-Pedersen, 2013) in parallel to expansion. But selective 
activism is not the only alternative to maturity. We know from the US experience that 
‘maturity’ can be followed by something very different – gridlock – where old, ambitious 
policies remain in place, often after efforts to dismantle them falter, and new problems 
are not addressed (due to insufficient cross-partisan support for new policies). With the 
higher (i.e., federal) level gridlocked, the onus falls on other, perhaps more local, levels of 
government and private actors to take up the slack (Sousa and Klyza, 2017; Vogel, 2003).
This chapter reviews the rapidly growing literature on long-term policy dynamics in 
the environmental sector, encompassing policy expansion, dismantling and/or stasis 
(Burns, Tobin, and Sewerin, 2019). The following section sets out the analytical indica-
tors of change that academics have developed to measure the magnitude and direction 
of change since the early 1990s. The third section then reviews what might be driving 
the policy dynamics, especially any attempts at dismantling existing EU environmen-
tal policies. The fourth section applies these insights to make sense of the unfolding 
impact of two recent major events – namely, the post 2008 Eurozone crisis and Brexit – 
on environmental policy dynamics. The final section concludes.
Summary points
• After 50 years of more or less steady policy expansion, in recent years, there 
has been a sharp fall in the adoption of new EU policies, in the context of 
multiple crises at EU level.
• For some, this fall indicates that the environmental acquis is mature and 
secure – and that the EU’s focus should turn to improving implementation. 
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Capturing the dynamics of policy change
The decline in the production of new environmental policy at EU level has been ex-
plained in the literature in three different ways. One explanation is that environmental 
policy has matured to the point where most environmental challenges are being ad-
dressed. Another is that the EU is still ambitious, but only selectively so. Thus, while 
some areas of environmental action have become more ambitious, others are being ig-
nored and/or have become less ambitious. A third explanation is because of a growing 
polarisation of environmental politics, the EU has succumbed to political gridlock.
Exploring these different explanations requires us to delve into the basic nature 
of policy as well as the political context in which specific policies are debated and 
adopted. Howlett and Cashore (2009) distinguish between policy ends and policy 
means, which can each be subdivided in further sub-categories based on different lev-
els of abstraction (from what are the general goals to what are the specific settings of 
policy instruments on the ground). Conversely, Bauer and Knill (2012) suggest two 
indicators: density (the number of policy instruments in a given policy area) and inten-
sity (covering both ambition and scope, i.e., whether the policy instrument is narrowly 
or broadly targeted). This same typology of density and intensity can be itself further 
subdivided – hence, in their Index of Climate Policy Activity, Schaffrin, Sewerin, and 
Seubert (2014) break down intensity into six categories: policy integration, scope, tar-
gets, budget, implementation and monitoring. Most studies, however, have measured 
changes in density and intensity.
Building on these studies, the remainder of this section looks at the density and 
intensity (scope, ambition and budget) of EU environmental policy. While a mature 
acquis would imply limited changes in density and intensity, as well as limited political 
demands for policy change, gridlock is likely to be characterised by a failure to expand 
and/or dismantle policy. Finally, selective activism would see both expansion and dis-
mantling being successful in different sub-areas of the environmental acquis.
The density of policy
A first step is to agree what the stock of environmental policy actually constitutes. 
After 50 years of steady policy expansion, this question is actually more difficult to 
answer than one may casually think. Formally, the acquis communautaire covers the 
Treaties, legislation adopted by European institutions, the evolving case law of the 
CJEU (see Chapter 7), political declarations adopted by the EU and any international 
agreements to which the EU is signatory (see Chapter 15). Searching through the EU 
legislation database, EUR-lex, yields over 1,000 binding legislative acts in the envi-
ronmental area. This figure is already less than the whole acquis as it does not cover 
For others, it shows the acquis is past its prime and/or should be reformed, 
and/or that EU lacks political ambition and should adopt new policies.
• In order to assess whether policy is expanding, contracting or staying 
broadly the same, this chapter analyses the historical dynamics of policy 
change and explores what drives EU political actors to support, or oppose, 
higher levels of environmental ambition.
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international and EU Treaties, nor CJEU case law. Delreux and Happaerts (2016) ap-
proximate the acquis by measuring a subset of EU environmental legislation (only 
directives and regulations) and they find about 400 relevant texts in 2014. Search-
ing EUR-lex for all environmental directives and regulations in force in 2020 (see 
Figure 19.1), we find 466 relevant legal texts. Critically, many of these either predate the 
use of the ordinary legislative procedure in environmental decision making (i.e., legis-
lation adopted by the Council of the EU only) or cover implementation legislation pro-
duced by the European Commission (delegated and implementing acts) and adopted 
under different comitology procedures. This lower figure of 466 nicely illustrates the 
growing importance of delegated and implementing acts in the environmental sector 
(Burns and Tobin, 2020) (see also Chapters 6 and 8).
DG Environment equates the environmental acquis to an even smaller subset. In 
the context of enlargement negotiations, the acquis – understood as the rules that pro-
spective member states need to integrate into their own legal orders before becoming 
members – is limited to a vague reference to ‘over 200 pieces of EU environmental 
legislation’ (DG Environment, 2020). Looking at Chapter 27 of the ongoing enlarge-
ment negotiations with the Western Balkan countries, we find less than 200 legal texts 
covering ten areas of environmental action (see Table 19.1).
Although the overall scale of EU environmental policy is open to discussion, the 
overall scope of EU environmental action is at least quite clear, ranging from noise pol-
lution to industrial pollution control and action on climate change. But it also shows 
the limits of tracking environmental action solely by measuring the density of policy. 
Hence, in the environment enlargement chapter, the two largest bodies of legislation 
cover, on the one hand, waste, with 70 pieces of legislation, and, on the other hand, 
chemicals and GMOs with 47. Conversely nature protection only has nine pieces, 
and climate change eight. These large numbers do not of course imply that the EU 
Figure 19.1 EU environmental policy in 2020 – legal types and responsible institutions. 
Source: based on Eur-Lex.
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considers waste issues to be any more important than say climate change, nature pro-
tection, water and air quality combined. Rather, these relatively large numbers also 
speak to the highly technical nature of these areas, covering a number of industries, 
sectors and business activities.
Armed with a measure of density, analysts can then start to measure the relative 
change in the acquis over time, where increases denote policy expansion and cuts indicate 
policy dismantling. But as Figure 19.2 shows, both can happen at the same time. For ex-
ample, the replacement in 2008 of the 1996 Air Quality framework Directive (96/62/EC) 
and three out of four of its daughter directives with a new framework directive (2008/50/
EC) was a mixture of policy dismantling and expansion. Therefore, while measuring den-
sity furnishes important insights into policy change, it may actually tell us very little about 
changes in policy ambition. This is why measuring policy intensity is equally critical.
The intensity of policy
As with density, there are different ways to measure intensity (see Box 19.1), as well as 
different ways in which to measure changes in intensity (i.e., either relative or absolute 
Table 19.1  The contents of the EU’s environment enlargement chapter
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Figure 19.2 The density of EU air quality policy, 1980–2020.
Source: based on data from European Commission, 2020a
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changes). Absolute measures use a scale of intensity against which each piece of policy 
is graded. A number of variations in this approach have been developed in the litera-
ture. For example, Burns and Carter (2010) developed a five-point typology measuring 
whether European Parliament amendments furthered or hindered greater ecological 
modernisation. This has since been updated to produce a five-point scoring table 
ranging from negative to high environmental ambition and applied to all stages of the 
legislative process, from the initial proposal to final legislation (Burns, Eckersleyet al., 
2019). Alternatively, instead of ranking intensity as a whole, Schaffrin et al. (2014) 
proposed breaking down intensity into six different sub-indicators (integration, scope, 
targets, budget, implementation, monitoring) which are, in turn, graded 0 or 1. The 
overall policy ranking using their Index of Policy Activity is made up of the sum of 
each of these indicators, allowing comparison between, for example, policies with a 
high dedicated budget and policies with a clear monitoring process. Conversely, rela-
tive rankings (see, e.g., Gravey and Jordan, 2016) track how new legislation compares 
to its predecessor – is it more or less ambitious? Is the budget allocated greater or 
smaller? Has the scope widened or narrowed? Both approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages. Absolute rankings provide an amalgamated grade (where, for example, 
increases in budget can offset decrease in implementation), while relative rankings can 
provide a finer-grained measure of the precise direction(s) of policy change that only 
really apply to quite mature bodies of policy.
Box 19.1 Where next for EU air quality policy?
How we define and measure policy dismantling has a direct impact on whether 
we find evidence of it or not. This issue, well known amongst social policy schol-
ars as ‘the dependent variable problem’, has been discussed in recent accounts 
of environmental policy dismantling at EU level. Thus, when studying the level 
and scope of 20 air policy instruments, Steinebach and Knill (2017, p. 438) char-
acterised the overall pattern of policy development between 1980 and 2014 as one 
of ‘continuous policy expansion’, with only very limited small-scale policy dis-
mantling events in the early 2000s. Conversely, Gravey and Moore (2018) studied 
the policy ambition of four key EU directives addressing air quality issues and 
found a sharp fall of policy ambition after 2002 with respect to the Ambient Air 
Directive.
Yet, if we consider the methods used in these two analyses, the results are actu-
ally not contradictory. Thus, Steinebach and Knill found that overall, newer gen-
erations of EU policy instruments were more ambitious. But Gravey and Moore 
judged the EU’s policy ambition against international standards, i.e., while the 
EU’s policy had become more ambitious, it had failed to keep pace with World 
Health Organisation guidelines which became ‘markedly more stringent due to 
new research on the health impacts of air pollution’ (2018, p. 30). Sometimes, 
dismantling is only thought of as encompassing the active removal of legal pro-
tections from the acquis. But a failure to keep up with international standards is 
an example of another, more subtle form of dismantling – what Bauer and Knill 
(2012) term ‘dismantling by default’ (whereby policy settings are not adjusted 
upwards despite new scientific knowledge).
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In summary, studying the dynamics of EU policy changes is still in its early days 
and methodological diversity is to be expected, and even welcome, as it allows analysts 
to capture better the complexity of policy change (although it can produce apparently 
puzzling results, see Box 19.1). But having measured policy change, we are still left 
with an even bigger puzzle: why do the policy actors introduced in Part II of this book 
seek to achieve expansion or dismantling at EU level?
What drives policy change?
Measuring policy change opens the door to more probing analyses of what ultimately 
drives policy dynamics at EU level. A useful starting point is to consider that each 
piece of the environmental acquis has a dual identity. First, it is a piece of policy, and as 
such, policy expansion and dismantling dynamics may differ from what exist in other 
policy areas such as social protection or health. Second, it is a piece of EU policy, and 
as such, policy expansion and dismantling dynamics may play out differently than at 
the member state level.
Summary points
• There is a growing scholarly interest in the analysis of environmental policy 
change, including measuring its magnitude (minor or major change) and di-
rection (expansion, stasis or dismantling).
• In practice, expansion, dismantling or stasis is not always clear-cut and can 
even occur simultaneously, greatly complicating the task of understanding 
long-term policy dynamics.
• When comparing the results of different studies, we need to be aware of their 
respective methodological choices.
Table 19.2  Four typical criticisms of EU environmental policy
Critics of environmental action Proponent of greater 
environmental action
Europhile Actors in favour of continued European 
integration who may be content 
with current levels of environmental 
ambition but who oppose 
environmental expansion to  
distract from other issues facing the 
EU (i.e., migration, Brexit, economic 
downturn)
Actors who see the future of 
European integration as a 
‘green Europe’, with strong 
environmental ambition 
and further environmental 
integration reinforcing each 
other’s
Eurosceptics Actors who oppose both environmental 
actions irrespective of the level of 
governance (for example, climate 
sceptics) and European integration
Actors who are opposed to the 
EU and want either less, or 
radically different form of 
European integration but 
support high environmental 
ambition irrespective of the 
level of governance
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This duality further informs how EU-level actors engage in environmental policy 
making. Thus, different DGs of the European Commission will engage differently, as 
will the various political party groups in the European Parliament (see Chapters 6 and 
7 for more details). Bringing these two characteristics (sector and level of governance) 
together allows us to draw an EU environmental policy discontent matrix (see Table 
19.2) which differentiates between criticisms that focus on the policy (a specific piece 
of EU legislation, i.e., targeting the environmental dimension of EU environmental ac-
tion) and those that focus on the polity (the EU, i.e., targeting the European dimension 
of EU environmental action).
Crucially, supporters of European integration and supporters of environmental 
action may not perfectly overlap (see Table 19.2). Thus, critics of EU environmental 
policy can be actors who:
• oppose both environmental action and European integration (e.g., the UK Inde-
pendence Party is sceptical both of EU integration and climate change) (Reed, 
2016).
• are wary of European integration but support environmental action at a more 
local or global level (e.g., La France Insoumise political party supports a profound 
ecological transition, but much less European integration).
• support continued European integration, but do not think environmental action 
should be a priority at EU level – e.g., the second Barroso Commission’s decision 
to focus on addressing the Eurozone crisis at the cost of most other policy priori-
ties (Gravey and Jordan, 2020).
• support continued European integration, but think that EU environmental action 
does not go far enough, e.g., many members of the Green 10 or the Greens/EFA 
MEPs (see Chapters 7 and 9).
The broader implication of Table 19.2 is that in order to understand policy dynamics 
at EU level, we need to draw both from the literature on environmental policy change, 
in particular dismantling, and on EU decision making.
What drives policy dismantling?
In his seminal work on policy dismantling, Paul Pierson argued that it is chiefly an 
exercise in blame avoidance (Pierson, 1994). While governments may be keen to cut 
public expenditure and social policy benefits, they will try to avoid being blamed by 
voters for doing so, e.g., blaming it on an external crisis or a different level of govern-
ance (such as the EU) or delaying the costs until well in the future (e.g., by building a 
long implementation phase into a given policy). Bauer and Knill (2012) used this basic 
insight as a starting point to consider environmental policy dynamics. Health and 
social policies typically produce diffuse costs – taxation is normally spread across the 
whole of society – but targeted benefits (focused on retired people, unemployed people, 
etc.), who can easily mobilise to oppose cuts and/or demand greater policy ambition. 
This is what drives the politics of dismantling in relation to Welfare State reform.
Conversely, environmental policies tend to produce concentrated costs – target-
ing specific industries or polluting activities – but diffuse benefits (broader society 
benefits from cleaner air and more biodiversity), making it more difficult to organise 
public support for policy expansion and/or against policy dismantling. Hence, envi-
ronmental policy dismantling can be expected to be driven by credit claiming, not 
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blame avoidance. Politicians may find they can win support from key industries by 
cutting environmental protections without losing the support from voters, especially 
if they are distracted by other, more immediate issues such as jobs and the economy. 
From David Cameron’s infamous ‘get rid of all the green crap’ comments (Carter and 
Clements, 2015) to the US Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to suspend 
the enforcement of environmental laws during the COVID-19 pandemic (Milman and 
Holden, 2020) (see also Chapter 20), politicians frequently offer to relax environmental 
rules when industries ask for policy support.
Bauer and Knill (2012) identified four ideal types of policy dismantling strategy, 
based on either political action or inaction (see Table 19.3). Bauer et al. expected en-
vironmental policy dismantling to be pursued principally through either active or 
symbolic dismantling strategies, that is, for politicians to openly call for cutting or 
weakening environmental policy, but not always follow up these announcements with 
actions to deliver on them. Whether this hypothesis still holds in Europe, where envi-
ronmental action has wide and growing popular support, is debatable (Burns, Tobin 
et al., 2019). We explore this question in the next section.
What drives policy dismantling at EU level?
In his work, Pierson (1994) compared two systems: the US and the UK. He found that 
it was comparatively easier to dismantle policies in a majoritarian system such as the 
UK, in which a Prime Minister with a large majority faces very few veto players, than 
in the US federal system which has a clear separation of powers and is thus riddled 
with veto points (see Chapter 11). Conversely, the high numbers of veto players in the 
US made it relatively easy to avoid blame for policy dismantling, whereas the UK gov-
ernment had nowhere to hide from voters. Building on this approach, Gravey and Jor-
dan (2016) have argued that we can expect policy dismantling to be an uphill challenge 
in the ‘hyperconsensual’ EU system, in which policy change can only be achieved with 
intensive cooperation in and between the European Parliament and the Council (see 
Chapter 11 for further details). This means that in the EU, as in the US, it is much eas-
ier to block new legislation (i.e., stopping the flow of legislation) than unpicking and 
cutting existing rules (cutting the stock of legislation).
Existing explanations of the dynamics of EU environmental policy making –  either 
noting maturity, selective ambition or gridlock (see Table 19.4) – start from a discussion 
Table 19.3  Four policy dismantling strategies




For example, delegating policy 
responsibility to another agency or level 
of governance without transferring 
adequate funding.
Active dismantling
For example, agreeing new law 
which reduces the scope, 




For example, failing to update existing 
legislation despite knowing it is outdated 
or faulty
Symbolic dismantling
For example, promising to 
dismantle without following 
through, e.g. commissioning 
a report into cutting red tape
Source: Adapted from Bauer and Knill (2012).
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of policy density and of falling numbers of new environmental legislation. The Juncker 
Commission reduced new legislative activity back to the level of the early 2000s (see 
Figure 19.3), but the fall was not evenly shared. If we consider the ordinary legislative 
procedure files which involved the ENVI Committee in the European Parliament (thus 
covering both environment and health, see Chapter 8), we observe a marked reduction 
in its activity. Critically, the reduction predates Juncker: ENVI’s activity as both a 
share of the European Parliament’s activity and in absolute terms has fallen constantly 
since the late 1990s.
This reduction in new policies is surprising if we recall that one popular characteri-
sation of the EU likens it to regulatory state (see Chapter 17). This gives the European 
Commission a strong vested interest in maintaining – and even expanding – the acquis. 
Table 19.4  The dynamics of EU environmental policy making: three competing 
characterisations
Maturity Current level of EU environmental action is broadly supported. 
Stasis prevails with limited expansion or dismantling. 
Environmental action is not a political priority, nor is it the focus 
of political contestation
Gridlock Both policy expansion and policy dismantling are attempted but fail. 
Environmental acquis experiences stasis, even though the need 
for environmental action becomes increasingly politicised and 
divisive
Selective activism Some parts of the environmental acquis experience expansion, 
while others are ignored or dismantled. Political debates focus on 
which areas of the acquis should be prioritised, and which can be 



















5th term 1999-2004 6th term 2004-2009 7th term 2009-2014 8th term 2014-2020
ENVI All OLP files ENVI as proportion of all OLP files
Figure 19.3 EU environmental policy: the fall in legislative output, 1999–2020.
Source: European Parliament Activity Reports
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Indeed, initial calls for dismantling in the 1990s were met with what can best be de-
scribed as symbolic dismantling (see Table 19.3). Hence, the Commission, at the behest 
of member states such as the UK, France and Germany, created lists of policies to be 
revised and published reports on how EU legislation complied with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, but did not actually remove existing policies or even 
slow down the production of new ones (Gravey and Jordan, 2020).
But the picture started changing in the 2000s – calls for environmental policy dis-
mantling not only came from outside the Commission but also from within, with a 
growing divide between DG Environment on the one hand and DG Competition (led 
by Commissioner Verheugen) on the other. Yet the Commission remained pro-policy 
expansion. Thus, writing in this period, Löfstedt (2007, p. 436) contended that ‘if the 
Commission was serious about promoting Verheugen’s agenda, Commission officials 
would soon be out of a job’. In recent years, the automatic assumption that the Com-
mission will always support policy expansion and oppose dismantling has been fur-
ther undermined. In their study of air and water policy dismantling from 1980 to 2014, 
Steinebach and Knill (2017) found that reduced policy ambition did not come from the 
legislators refusing to agree new policy proposals, but from the Commission failing to 
draft new proposals. In other words, far from being a policy entrepreneur advocating 
expansion at every opportunity, the European Commission had, they claimed, mor-
phed into a stout defender of the status quo. In the face of increased popular awareness 
and scientific knowledge about the health impact of air and water pollution, its failure 
to produce new proposals was not, they argue, simply evidence of political stagna-
tion. It is instead an example of dismantling by default, whereby insufficient or faulty 
policies were left unchanged. The central role played by the European Commission 
in EU decision making (see Chapter 6) renders EU environmental action particularly 
vulnerable to a form of selective activism whereby only some issues make it to the top 
of its political agenda.
The pivotal role of the European Commission
This shift in the European Commission’s views can be explained in two complemen-
tary ways: by noting changes within its internal structures; and by exploring changes 
in the context in which it operates. Under Barroso and Juncker’s leadership, the Com-
mission went through a process of presidentialisation, with a reinforcement of the 
Secretariat General and Presidency’s power over the policy DGs (Kassim, Connolly, 
Dehousse, Rozenberg and Bendjaballah, 2017). This took the form of greater use, first, 
of both impact assessments and ex post policy evaluations (see Chapter 14 for more 
details on both), and second, of political checks that every policy proposal put forward 
fitted with the political priorities of the Commission President. Such gatekeeping was 
exemplified by work done by the very first Vice-President of the European Commis-
sion, Frans Timmermans, in the Juncker Commission; all new policy proposals were 
carefully vetted by his team before being put to a vote in the College of Commission-
ers, thus opening the way for selective activism (Peterson, 2017).
The impact that presidentialisation had on the Commission’s legislative agenda was 
crucially dependent on the President’s personal political priorities, themselves heavily 
impacted by wider political context in Brussels. Critically, in his period in office, when 
the EU appeared to be in crisis, the Commission did not always call for ‘more Europe’. 
He deemed that the Commission’s role was to be the Guardian of the Treaties, not the 
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Guardian of the acquis. Thus, dismantling policies is an option if it helps to sustain the 
overall European integration project. This pattern continued in the von der Leyen Com-
mission, which pledged where necessary to ‘cut EU red tape’ (Gravey and Jordan, 2020).
This prioritisation of continued European integration over increasing environmen-
tal policy ambition can be detected in the Five Scenarios for a Future of Europe pub-
lished by the Juncker Commission in 2017 (see Box 19.2). These paid scant attention to 
either environment or climate action.
While the Commission was careful not to favour any single scenario, Scenario 4, 
which sees the EU ‘delivering more and faster in selected policy areas while doing 
less elsewhere’ (European Commission, 2017, p. 22), directly echoed the Juncker Com-
mission’s pledge to be ‘big on the big things and small on the small things’. It is note-
worthy than in Scenario 4, environment and climate are not amongst the ‘big’ things 
the EU should focus on. And finally, considering the three different explanations of 
Box 19.2 Where next? Five possible EU futures
In March 2017 the Juncker Commission published a White Paper setting out Five 
Scenarios for the Future of Europe. It commemorated the 60th anniversary of 
the Treaty of Rome and rejected a binary (i.e., more or less Europe) view of the 
future. The five scenarios were:
1  Carrying on:
The EU focuses on delivering its positive reform agenda.
2  Nothing but the Single Market:
The EU is gradually re-centred on the Single Market.
3  Those who want more, do more:
The EU allows willing member states to do more together in specific areas.
4  Doing less more efficiently:
 The EU focuses on delivering more and faster in selected policy areas while 
doing less in others.
5  Doing much more together
The EU decides to do much more together across all policy areas.
These scenarios offer different possibilities with regards to policy expansion 
and dismantling. Scenario 4 would, for example, see both take place; Scenario 
2 would see extensive dismantling of ‘non-essential’ policies; and Scenarios 3 
and 5 would see expansion, though only for some member states. Scenario 2 
in particular would threaten the EU environmental acquis with a ‘strong focus 
on reducing regulation at EU level’, leading to increasing differences in envi-
ronmental standards across the EU, accompanied by the EU being ‘no longer 
represented’ in international negotiations on issues such as climate change. In 
Scenario 4, the environment is presented as an area for less, not more, action, 
with a move away ‘from detailed harmonization towards a strict minimum’. The 
EU’s Climate Leadership is excluded from all but Scenarios 5 and 1. These sce-
narios were indicative of the Juncker Commission priorities and are not binding 
on its successor.
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EU environmental policy dynamics (see Table 19.4), the Five Scenarios correspond to 
‘maturity’ where most, if not all, political ambition is reserved for non-environmental 
matters.
EU environmental policy-making in times of crisis
As the EU wrestles with the Coronavirus pandemic and its unfolding economic con-
sequences, what will this crisis mean for environmental action? Will we see a green 
recovery, with a strong European Green Deal? Will we instead see different member 
states pulling the EU apart? Or will we see a recovery focused on narrow economic in-
dicators? While it is too early to reach firm conclusions, we can learn from the EU ex-
perience in handling two recent crises: the post-2008 economic and financial crisis and 
the political crisis of Brexit. This section reviews research on them both in the light 
of our three competing characterisations of policy change (see Table 19.4) – namely, 
maturity, selective activism and gridlock – building on our understanding of the criti-
cisms commonly levelled at EU environmental policy.
Economic austerity
While the economic crisis did not originate in Europe, it had long-lasting impact on 
the economic health and welfare of many countries in and outside the EU in the dec-
ade following 2008. When considering its impact, we need to distinguish between the 
flow of new legislation and the stock of environmental policy, i.e., the acquis. Starting 
with the flow, in response to the crisis, the Commission decided to prioritise policies 
that were strictly targeted at addressing the economic crisis and/or lessening its im-
pact (Knill, Steinebach, and Fernández-i-Marín, 2020). This became clear under the 
second Barroso Commission (2009–2014) during which new policies aimed at cutting 
plastic waste was delayed (ENDS Europe, 2013). This stance was reaffirmed at the 
start of the next (i.e., Juncker) Commission (2014–2019) which pledged to focus on ‘the 
“big things” like jobs and growth’, and not ‘present proposals that do not contribute to 
Summary points
• EU environmental policies have been be challenged on many grounds, in-
cluding their ‘Europeaness’ and their environmental ambition.
• The diffuse benefits and concentrated costs that are often generated by envi-
ronmental policy actions may lead politicians to try to claim political credit 
amongst critics by pledging to dismantle green rules.
• Nevertheless, actually dismantling EU policies has often been a slow, uphill 
battle given the need to achieve consensus amongst myriad of actors, includ-
ing the European Commission which is a pivotal actor.
• Recent developments have nevertheless demonstrated that the European 
Commission has a more ambivalent attitude to dismantling the environmen-
tal acquis than has historically been the case.
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these priorities’ (European Commission, 2014, p. 2). Comparing policy proposals ta-
bled by the two Barroso Commissions, Burns, Eckersley et al. (2019, p. 3) found a clear 
‘crisis effect’ characterised by a decline in the amount of EU environmental legislation 
brought forward and in the ambition of ‘new legislation’. However, not all sub-sectors 
of environmental policy making were affected in the same ways; while there were fewer 
environmental policy proposals overall in Barroso’s second term, the number of cli-
mate proposals rose sharply. Similarly, Gravey and Moore (2019) found that while ‘old’ 
policy areas such as air quality stagnated or even experienced dismantling (see Box 
19.1), climate policy increased in both density and ambition. Beyond climate change, 
another rare example of selective activism was the adoption of a new regulation on 
invasive species in 2014 (Justo-Hanani and Dayan, 2020).
However, as noted above, selective activism can in principle entail both limited ex-
pansion and dismantling. In other words, while limited expansion may well describe 
environmental action through the legislative process, a different picture may emerge in 
the post-legislative process, which in the EU corresponds to comitology (see  Chapter 6 
for details). This is broadly what happened after 2008. So, while during the legislative 
process, both the Council and Parliament voted to increase the ambition of some of 
the Commission’s proposals (Burns, Eckersley et al., 2019), in the post-legislative pro-
cess, the Commission ‘hidden away from legislative procedures’ was able to weaken 
environmental policy ambitions (Pollex and Lenschow, 2020, p. 32). Pollex and Len-
schow’s main finding – that dismantling happens ‘through the back door’ of delegated 
and implementing acts in the field of sustainable consumption – was confirmed by the 
work of Burns and Tobin (2020, p. 13), who found that ‘comitology policies were less 
ambitious on average during the crisis era’.
Considering both the reduced flow of new legislation and the drop in infringement 
action against member states failing to implement the environmental acquis (on this, 
see also Chapter 13), Knill et al. (2020, p. 375) argued that ‘the Commission has clearly 
given up its former role as an environmental policy entrepreneur’. This was also evi-
dent in the Commission’s attitude to the stock of environmental policy – both  Barroso 
II and Juncker Commissions increasingly engaged with existing environmental legis-
lation through the prism of cutting regulatory burdens and costs, not increasing ambi-
tion (Gravey and Jordan, 2020).
Finally, analyses of the impact of the crisis on EU environmental policy also need 
to consider the interplay between EU and national policies. Comparing the direc-
tion of environmental policy change in EU and non-EU countries, Burns, Tobin 
et al. (2019) found that ‘the EU can act as a safeguard against policy dismantling and 
insulate against changes in government’, but such ‘safeguarding’ is far from universal 
as EU-supported austerity policies in Greece profoundly undermined Greece’s ability 
to implement and apply EU environmental policies (Lekakis and Kousis, 2013). Thus, 
EU environmental policy in the aftermath of the crisis is best characterised as exhib-
iting bursts of selective activism but longer periods of dismantling via the back door 
of comitology.
Brexit and its aftermath
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU occurred via three sets of negotiations: the rene-
gotiation of the UK’s membership prior to the 2016 referendum; the 2016–2019 with-
drawal negotiations; and the post-2019 negotiation of the future relationship. All three 
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had an environmental dimension. As Chapter 5 argued, member states can be both 
leaders and laggards in different areas of environmental policy at the same or even 
different times. Prior to Brexit, the UK hindered EU policy expansion in some areas 
(fracking, soil, air quality) but supported it in others (climate change, the greening 
of the CAP and fisheries policy) (Hilson, 2018). Beyond specific policy areas, the UK 
was, however, often in the vanguard of a group of member states criticising the envi-
ronmental acquis on the grounds of both subsidiarity (arguing certain environmental 
issues, such as soil protection and carbon taxation, were best dealt with by member 
states directly) and proportionality (arguing EU rules were placing unnecessary bur-
dens on private actors).
As such, it came as no great surprise that the EU’s regulatory powers were criti-
cised in the period prior to the 2016 EU referendum (Gravey and Jordan, 2020). The 
then UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, negotiated a New Settlement with the EU, 
seeking concessions in four main areas (economic governance, competitiveness, sov-
ereignty and immigration) which he hoped to use to convince UK voters to remain 
in the EU. On competitiveness, he demanded a review of the entire acquis to check 
whether it complied with subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as an agreement by 
the Commission to work on establishing specific regulatory burden reduction targets 
(Poptcheva and Eatock, 2016), which critics had long suspected would weaken exist-
ing environmental policies (Gravey and Jordan, 2020). Both points were included in a 
draft European Commission declaration as part of the New Settlement. But the UK 
voted to leave, precipitating a massive crisis in UK and EU politics.
During the first few months of the von der Leyen Commission, the EU appeared 
intent on continuing on the same path with or without the UK. Her Commission was 
not bound by David Cameron’s New Settlement, yet still decided to deliver on one of 
the new settlement promise (specific regulatory burden reduction targets) by phasing 
in a ‘one in, one out’ policy, whereby ‘every legislative proposal creating new burdens 
should relieve people and businesses of an equivalent existing burden at EU level in 
the same policy area’ (European Commission, 2019b). This raised concerns amongst 
environmental NGOs in Brussels, who felt it was ‘incompatible’ with the EU’s pledge 
to increase its climate efforts (Green10, 2019).
However, maintaining existing EU environment standards quickly rose to prominence 
once Brexit negotiations got underway (covering the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and 
its future relationship with the EU). So-called level-playing field provisions emerged as 
a particularly contentious point, particularly given that the EU had by that point, com-
mitted to adopt and implement an ambitious package of new legislation contained in the 
European Green Deal. The EU wished to lock the UK into existing EU environmental 
protections mechanisms, whereas the UK preferred a looser arrangement whilst still 
preserving tariff- and quota-free access to the EU’s single market.
After protracted negotiations on the withdrawal, the two sides were only able to 
bridge their differences by adopting, in late 2019, a non-binding Political Declaration 
(European Commission, 2019a), which outlined the commitments, both legal and po-
litical, that could eventually inform the wording of a subsequent treaty specifying the 
future trading relationship between them (Jordan, Gravey, Moore, and Reid, 2020). 
As Box 19.3 reveals, the Political Declaration recognised the strong environmental 
dimension of the playing field between the two sides. As Chapters 2 and 3 explained, 
EU environmental policies had originally developed to underpin the EU’s Single Mar-
ket, arguably creating the world’s largest and most sophisticated level-playing field. 
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Once the Declaration had been struck, negotiators moved on to discuss what form the 
new level playing field should take, at which point the interlinking of environmental 
ambition and fair competition re-emerged as key sticking points in the negotiations, 
alongside state-aid rules and fisheries – a somewhat ironic turn of events as the envi-
ronment was only a footnote in Cameron’s New Settlement and was barely mentioned 
at all during the highly emotive 2016 EU referendum campaign. The EU’s insistence on 
the need for common environmental rules was formalised when it published its formal 
negotiating mandate, which not only called for a form of environmental policy stasis 
(or, to quote the jargon, ‘dynamic alignment’ between the two parties), but a commit-
ment to further policy expansion:
the envisaged agreement should uphold the common high standards in the areas 
of State aid, competition, state-owned enterprises, social and employment stand-
ards, environmental standards, climate change, and relevant tax matters (…) the 
envisaged partnership should commit the Parties to continue improving their re-
spective levels of protection with the goal of ensuring high levels of protection [in 
these areas].
(European Commission, 2020b) (emphasis added).
Box 19.3 Brexit and the environment: the 2019 Political Declaration
XIV. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR OPEN AND FAIR COMPETITION
77. Given the Union and the United Kingdom’s geographic proximity 
and economic interdependence, the future relationship must ensure open 
and fair competition, encompassing robust commitments to ensure a level 
playing field. The precise nature of commitments should be commensurate 
with the scope and depth of the future relationship and the economic con-
nectedness of the Parties. These commitments should prevent distortions 
of trade and unfair competitive advantages. To that end, the Parties should 
uphold the common high standards applicable in the Union and the United 
Kingdom at the end of the transition period in the areas of state aid, com-
petition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change, 
and relevant tax matters. The Parties should in particular maintain a ro-
bust and comprehensive framework for competition and state aid control 
that prevents undue distortion of trade and competition; commit to the 
principles of good governance in the area of taxation and to the curbing 
of harmful tax practices; and maintain environmental, social and employ-
ment standards at the current high levels provided by the existing com-
mon standards. In so doing, they should rely on appropriate and relevant 
Union and international standards, and include appropriate mechanisms 
to ensure effective implementation domestically, enforcement and dispute 
settlement. The future relationship should also promote adherence to and 
effective implementation of relevant internationally agreed principles and 
rules in these domains, including the Paris Agreement.
(European Commission, 2019a)
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This demand went well beyond what Boris Johnson’s UK government wanted – a 
standard, free trade agreement in which both sides enjoyed full regulatory autonomy 
(Jordan et al., 2020).
In summary, both crises exhibited elements of environmental neglect (stasis and dis-
mantling attempts characterised both the non-climate parts of the acquis during the 
economic crisis and the UK’s New Settlement) and ambition (continued climate policy 
expansion during the economic crisis, strong commitment to an environmental level- 
playing field in Brexit negotiations). Both confirmed that the EU can be somewhat 
hypocritical in both supporting and undermining its environmental ambitions to suit 
its political priorities (Knill et al., 2018). Thus, the Commission – the EU institution 
which seemed prepared to loosen environmental protections during the economic 
 crisis – subsequently sought to monitor in fine detail the maintenance of environmen-
tal policy and governance protections within the UK to ensure that they did not regress 
after Brexit. The UK, perhaps understandably, argued that no other EU trade agreement 
attempted to bind another trading partner so closely to the environmental acquis, while 
the EU emphasised that the UK’s economic size and geographical proximity meant that 
it was unreasonable to treat it as a conventional trading partner (Box 19.3).
Conclusions
After decades of almost uninterrupted legal constitutionalisation and policy expan-
sion, EU environmental policy finds itself challenged by the same crises that engulfed 
other areas of European integration – the global financial crisis, Brexit, which saw a 
member state leave the EU for the first time, and COVID-19 to name just three. In or-
der to understand how they have impacted EU environmental action, this chapter has 
reviewed the rapidly growing literature on broader EU policy dynamics, investigating 
three competing explanations: maturity, gridlock and selective activism.
It reviewed the different methods for understanding policy dynamics, encompass-
ing, amongst other things, different tools for measuring policy density (the number of 
policies or policy instruments) and policy intensity (the scope and ambition of policy). 
It then investigated whether, over time, these two indicators have increased (policy ex-
pansion), decreased (policy dismantling) or stayed the same (policy stasis). It revealed 
Summary points
• Austerity at EU and national levels revealed the fragility of the EU environ-
mental policy ambitions, which appeared to narrow down to climate change 
and reviewing and possibly updating existing legislation.
• The exogenous shock of Brexit witnessed a renewed commitment by the EU 
to maintain a level-playing field with the UK, built on both parties main-
taining high environmental standards.
• Both crises usefully revealed that the EU’s political support for environmen-
tal protection is actually quite variable; at times, it veered between down-
playing the need for new policy protections and then suddenly advocating 
them.
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that over the last 50 years, the environmental acquis has not steadily expanded and 
become ambitious over time – a story that dominated early academic accounts of EU 
environmental policy (see Chapter 4 for details). In fact, the overall picture has been 
long, more complicated and hence difficult to interpret; dismantling, expansion and 
stasis have occurred at the same time and even within the same policy instrument. 
However, clear and unambiguous examples of policy dismantling have been conspicu-
ously rare over the last 50 years, with EU environmental policy characterised mainly 
by a mix of stasis and limited expansion. These findings offer stronger support to the 
‘selective activism’ explanation outlined above.
Alongside tools to measure what is happening to policy, recent research has also 
sought to explain why changes have happened. This chapter identified four ideal types 
of criticism that are repeatedly levelled at EU environmental action. The ideal types 
highlighted how critics can be organised alongside not one, but two cleavages (pro/an-
ti-European integration and pro/anti-environmental action). It further discussed how 
the consensual nature of EU decision-making systems actively hinders dismantling, 
although the European Commission is nonetheless a critical actor. When it shifts po-
sition, it alters the flow of new legislation.
Finally, it investigated the impact of both Brexit and the global financial crisis on 
EU environmental action. It showed how, in both cases, selective activism had even-
tually prevailed, albeit with some ‘back door’ dismantling through post-legislative (or 
comitology) instruments (what Chapter 11 discusses as transnational decision-making 
processes) together with a narrowing down in the focus of environmental ambition to 
more climate mitigation-related issues. Critically, recent research on both crises has 
confirmed that the European Commission is not an environmental policy entrepre-
neur by default; instead, it pursues further environmental ambition when it is aligned 
with its broader political agenda, thus confirming that the current dynamics of EU 
environmental policy are those of ‘selective activism’. Thus, while the very recent burst 
of environmental ambition that bore the European Green Deal was welcomed by envi-
ronmental NGOs, it was narrower in scope (mostly about climate, not environmental 
issues more broadly) than previous periods of environmental activism. Time will tell 
whether the levels of political commitment required to put it fully into practice are 
maintained across the EU institutions and all 27 member states.
Summary points
• When describing and explaining the long-term dynamics of EU environ-
mental action, we need to be able to measure the magnitude and direction 
of policy change.
• Support for and opposition to environmental action at EU level can be un-
derstood as varying along two dimensions: the Europeanness (or otherwise) 
of the EU and whether it is pro (or anti) environmental protection.
• The EU’s continued environmental ambition is not a given; recent dynam-
ics have revealed fluctuating levels of support even within the European 
Commission.
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Online resources
• European Commission: Better Regulation, why and how: https://ec. europa.eu/
info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation- 
why-and-how_en
• Corporate Europe Observatory: ‘Better Regulation’: corporate-friendly de-
regulation in disguise? https://corporateeurope.org/en/power-lobbies/2016/06/
better-regulation-corporate-friendly-deregulation-disguise
• Brexit and Environment: A network of academics analysing the impact of Brexit 
on the environment: https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/
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